The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 5/12/2023

 

May 12, 2023                                                                      Volume XXI, Issue 10
IN THIS ISSUE:
 
ISWAP Attacks Northern Nigerian State of Jigawa for First Time
Jacob Zenn
 
Belgium Grapples with Lasting Impact of Islamic State Attacks
Jacob Zenn
 
The Implications of the Arrest of Imran Khan on Pakistan's Stability
Syed Fazl-e-Haider 
 
West Papuan Insurgents Increase Attacks in Bid to Gain International Attention
Uday Bakhshi
 
US Counter-Terrorism in Kurdistan: Strengthening Iran’s Allies at Erbil’s Expense
Rich Outzen and Necdet Ozcelik

ISWAP Attacks Northern Nigerian State of Jigawa for First Time

Jacob Zenn

In July 2021, an emir in Jigawa State in northern Nigeria announced that Jigawa was “the most peaceful state in the country” and that the state had “no problem [with] Boko Haram,” referring to Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) (dailypost.ng, July 6, 2021). The emir’s claims were not without merit because Jigawa had at that time—and indeed until April of this year—remained impervious to ISWAP, even while all of its neighboring states fell victim to the group’s attacks.

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Belgium Grapples with Lasting Impact of Islamic State Attacks

Jacob Zenn

On May 6, Belgium’s prosecutor’s office announced that it arrested seven Islamic State (IS) supporters, including at least four from Chechnya, who were plotting attacks in the country (kavkaz-uzel.eu, May 6). The counter-terrorism operation is notable because IS has otherwise been largely absent from the European security environment since the group lost its “territorial caliphate” and its “caliph,” Abubakar al-Baghdadi, in 2019. The operation nevertheless indicates that the possibility for terrorist attacks in Belgium—if not Europe more broadly—still remains.

Coinciding with these arrests, Belgium also arrested an Iraqi who had been a part of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or one of its successor groups. He had allegedly participated in bombings of the Green Zone in Baghdad in 2009 and 2010, which killed more than 375 and injured more than 2,000 (kxan.com, May 5). Although there are concerns in Belgium that the arrest of an Iraqi and several Chechens may unfairly lead to backlash against these ethnic groups or immigrants more broadly, the arrests have prompted heightened awareness of the continued risk of terrorism (nationalnews.com, May 6).
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The Implications of the Arrest of Imran Khan on Pakistan's Stability

Syed Fazl-e-Haider 
 
[Editor’s Note: This is a developing story. Since the writing of this article, the Islamabad High Court (IHC) has declared Imran Khan’s arrest “invalid and unlawful,” releasing him from jail and granting Khan two weeks of bail in the Al-Qadir Trust corruption case and 10 days of protective bail for the three charges of terrorism he faces. Further, the IHC has decided that Khan may not be arrested again until May 15 for any cases filed before May 9; similarly, he may not be arrested until May 17 for any cases filed after this date (Dawn, May 12). Whether this move will deescalate the tense situation in Pakistan is not yet known.]

Pakistan's former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) (also known as “The Justice Movement”), have been facing terrorism charges. This comes after the current coalition government, led by Shehbaz Sharif, launched a crackdown on PTI in March. At that time, PTI supporters were set to hold a rally in Lahore to kick off the election campaign in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces (Business Recorder, March 9). Pakistani authorities ultimately arrested Khan at the Islamabad High Court on May 8 as part of a corruption case, for which he was attending a hearing. His arrest has sparked countrywide protests and brought normal life and business activities in Pakistan to a halt (Dawn, May 9).

Dozens of court cases have been filed against Khan and his party leaders. Many PTI leaders and activists have been detained for various charges, to include terrorism (Express Tribune, March 20). For example, a former minister in Khan’s cabinet, Fawad Chaudhary, another former minister, Sheikh Rashid, Khan’s nephew, Hassan Niazi, and former lawmaker Ali Zaidi are among the PTI activists who have been arrested. Ultimately, these terrorism cases against Khan, his party, and its followers reflect the goal of side-lining Khan ahead of the coming national election. These are to be held after July, when the present National Assembly’s five-year term comes to an end.

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West Papuan Insurgents Increase Attacks in Bid to Gain International Attention

Uday Bakhshi
 
On April 14, the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) shot at a small plane that was landing at an airstrip in Intan Jaya Regency in Indonesia’s restive Papuan provinces (Twitter/@udayxSEA, April 14). [1] The TPNPB asserted that it would continue to target aircraft and pilots, including foreigners, after the attack. This attack came more than two months after the TPNPB kidnapped a New Zealander pilot, Philip Mehrtens, in Nduga Regency in the West Papuan highlands in February (thejakartapost.com, February 7).

The TPNPB group in Nduga is led by Egianus Kogoya. He is a young commander and has made his local branch one of the most active and violent of all TPNPB branches. For Mehrtens release, the TPNPB is demanding negotiations with Indonesia to gain independence for West Papua. On April 15, the TPNPB in Nduga also ambushed Indonesian security forces conducting search operations for Mehrtens and claimed to have killed 15 soldiers. The Indonesian military initially denied this and claimed only one soldier died and a few others were injured, although the military has since admitted that five soldiers were killed. There are also reports stating at least six soldiers lost their lives (liputan6.com, April 23; abc.net.au, April 17; jubi.id, April 18).

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US Counter-Terrorism in Kurdistan: Strengthening Iran’s Allies at Erbil’s Expense

Rich Outzen and Necdet Ozcelik
 
Two Eurocopter AS350 helicopters crashed in northern Iraq’s rural Duhok province on March 15, killing the nine heavily armed passengers on board. The deceased were initially identified as members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist organization by Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) counter-terrorism officials (Kurdistan 24, March 16). Shortly thereafter, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are affiliated with the PKK but partner with US military forces in Syria, clarified that the deceased were members of its highly-trained Anti-Terror Units (YAT) (Al-Monitor, March 17). 

The SDF announcement that the flights were part of a “security and military exchange” did little to answer these questions, and Washington has remained tight-lipped about the expanding activities of its proxy (NPA, March 20). The incident has, therefore, raised a number of questions that remain unanswered, and largely underexamined, more than a month later:

  • First, who provided helicopters to the SDF, and who flew them? The SDF is an ideologically Marxist-leaning non-state armed group, operates with an annual US subsidy of more than $180 million, and does not operate helicopters according to published budgets (CTEF 23, April 2022; Medium, May 20, 2020);
  • Second, why would a militia paid by the US to fight the Islamic State (IS) in Syria fly clear across Iraq—without notifying KRG authorities—to Sulaymaniyah near the border with Iran? (Kurdistan 24, March 19); and
  • Third, given rising tensions between Erbil, which is run by the strongly US-allied Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Sulaymaniyah, which is run by the PKK-friendly (and Iran-friendly) Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), how does the increasingly long reach of the SDF impact power balances in northern Iraq (Al-Monitor, March 17)?
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