March 18, 2023 Volume XXI, Issue 6 |
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IN THIS ISSUE:
Peru Seeks to Close Door on Shining Path
Jacob Zenn
South Korea Cracks Down on Cryptocurrency Transfers to Central Asian Jihadists
Jacob Zenn
Will Iran’s Conventional Army Join the Drone Export Game in Ukraine and Beyond?
Marie Donovan
The Haqqani-Akhundzada Rift: Could Civil War Break Out in the Taliban’s Ranks?
Sudha Ramachandran
The Deradicalization and Parole of Indonesia’s Umar Patek - the Bombmaker of Bali
Irma Rahim
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Peru Seeks to Close Door on Shining Path
Jacob Zenn
The February 11 ambush in the valley of the Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM) region of Peru may prove to be the final nail in the coffin for Shining Path. With seven officers killed in the ambush, including from the National Directorate of Special Operations and the Natividad police force, the Peruvian government has now become more determined to not only eradicate the remnants of Shining Path in VRAEM, but also the narco-trafficking industry more generally (Elcomercio, February 12). Following the ambush, Peruvian president Dina Boluarte vowed to “fight against this alliance of terrorism and drug-trafficking in the VRAEM and throughout the nation’s territory” and asserted that “[w]e will not allow more deaths and more violence” (Ambito, February 13). |
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South Korea Cracks Down on Cryptocurrency Transfers to Central Asian Jihadists
Jacob Zenn
On January 16, two Uzbek and Kazakh citizens in South Korea were arrested for violating the country’s anti-terrorism funding laws by using cryptocurrency to fund the Syrian al-Qaeda-aligned jihadist group Katibat Tavhid wal-Jihad (KTJ) (Yonhap News Agency, February 16). Their funding of KTJ was, however, relatively minimal, with the Uzbek having sent to KTJ approximately $8,000 and the Kazakh having sent less than $1,000. Although South Korea has not experienced any jihadist-related terrorist attacks, the country has been on alert for such attacks since 2008. This terrorism funding case has pushed the country’s intelligence services to reinvigorate investigation into other possible funders of terrorism in the country. |
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Will Iran’s Conventional Army Join the Drone Export Game in Ukraine and Beyond?
Marie Donovan
Coverage regarding Iran’s growing exports of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including those recently sent to Russia for use in Ukraine, have generally focused on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC, an unconventional force, is known for its support for militants and non-state actors across the Middle East. However, rarely do reports reference Iran’s other military—the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, also known as “the Artesh”—which is focused on defending Iran against territorial threats.
The Artesh may soon be attracting more attention. The Arash-2 suicide drone, recently requested by Russia, are among Iran’s newest models (Young Journalists Club, January 9; DEFA Press, September 8, 2022; Fars News, November 8, 2022). Unlike Iran’s previously exported drones, this one is designed, built, and operated entirely by the Artesh (Reuters, October 18, 2022). |
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The Haqqani-Akhundzada Rift: Could Civil War Break Out in the Taliban’s Ranks?
Sudha Ramachandran
On February 11, in a speech at the graduation ceremony of an Islamic religious school in Afghanistan’s Khost province, the Taliban’s powerful Minister of Interior, Sirajuddin Haqqani, alleged the organization’s “power monopolization and defamation of the entire [ruling] system have become common.” He did not name the Taliban’s Supreme Leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada, in his speech. However, his reference to “power monopolization” was aimed at the reclusive Taliban emir, who retains a tight grip over Taliban decision-making. “This situation cannot be tolerated any longer,” Haqqani stated. Soon after, the Taliban’s spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, lashed out at those criticizing the Taliban leadership. “According to Islamic ethics, the emir, minister, or government official should not be criticized publicly and in such a way as to insult him,” Mujahid asserted (Alarabiya News, February 13). |
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The Deradicalization and Parole of Indonesia’s Umar Patek - the Bombmaker of Bali
Irma Rahim
On December 14, 2022, Umar Patek sat next to his friend and mentor in Indonesia’s deradicalization program, Ali Fauzi, and expressed remorse for his role in the 2002 Bali bombing. Patek further apologized to the families of 88 Australian terror victims in particular, who still deemed his attacks unforgivable (Kompas, December 14, 2022). The news that Patek would be eligible for parole on Indonesia's Independence Day several months earlier on August 17, 2022, however, already infuriated families of the Bali bombing victims and spurred Australia to launch a diplomatic protest (Detik, August 19, 2022; Detik, August 22, 2022). |
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