The Fourth Nuclear-Weapons-Related Testing Site Located: Another Parchin Site, More Undeclared Nuclear Material Possible
By David Albright and Sarah Burkhard[1] September 7, 2022
Executive Summary Background · The Amad Plan was the code name for Iran’s crash nuclear weapons program in the 1990s and early 2000s, documented in the Iranian Nuclear Archive secured by Israel in 2018 and summarized in Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons by David Albright, Sarah Burkhard and the Good ISIS team. The extent to which Iran continued parts of the nuclear weapons program after the Amad Plan ended in 2003 is still not fully known. · Iran has consistently violated its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and fully account for its past and present nuclear activities. · The IAEA has publicly discussed four locations where it found evidence of undeclared nuclear material, and it has declared one of these sites a clear nuclear safeguards violation under the NPT. The resolution of the undeclared materials, equipment, and activities at the other three locations awaits truthful answers from Iran. Findings · The present report is a technical analysis of Golab Dareh, a test site identified in the Nuclear Archive. This is one of a number of sites associated with explosive testing of nuclear weapons components and the development of associated, high-speed diagnostic equipment. We did not know the exact location of Golab Dareh until recently when we obtained the site’s coordinates from officials knowledgeable about the Nuclear Archive. · Based on the available information, we conclude that tests using uranium may have taken place at Golab Dareh, another indication that the number of sites involving undeclared nuclear material may be larger than just the four discussed publicly by the IAEA. Recommendations · It is critical for the IAEA to continue its investigation of Iran’s violation of nuclear safeguards under the NPT. Absent a marked shift in Iran’s actions, the IAEA Board of Governors should condemn Iran’s non-cooperation and refer the issue to the UN Security Council. · The United States and Europe should refuse Iran’s demands to end the ongoing IAEA investigation as a condition for a revived nuclear deal under the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) framework. The West should instead pressure Iran to cooperate with the IAEA by strengthening sanctions, including so-called snapback sanctions allowed for in case of Iranian non-compliance with the JCPOA.
Golab Dareh Explosive Test Site The Parchin complex near Tehran contains another Amad Plan site, Golab Dareh, bringing the total there to three. The newly located site is one of four known sites associated with explosive testing of nuclear weapons components and the development of associated, high-speed diagnostic equipment. We have previously discussed Golab Dareh in our reports and book Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons,[2] but we did not know its location until recently, when we obtained the site’s coordinates from officials knowledgeable about the Iran Nuclear Archive. Based on the available information, this site may have conducted tests using uranium, another indication that the number of sites involving undeclared nuclear material may be larger than just the four cases discussed publicly by the International Atomic Energy Agency.[3] Golab Dareh was one of four identified Amad sites involved in nuclear weapons-related research and development experimentation. Figure 1 shows its location at the Parchin complex, along with the location of the other two nuclear weapons-related sites at Parchin: one is another explosives testing location that included two internal test cell facilities (Taleghan 1 and 2), and the other is the Shahid Boroujerdi underground site that was slated to make weapon-grade uranium cores of nuclear weapons. Figure 2 provides a close-up of the Golab Dareh site as it appeared in March 2004. The site features a large bunker protected by an earthen berm, another smaller bunker, and a rectangular building flanked by a blast deflection wall and berm. The two bunkers and the building are positioned in a triangle.
Read the full report here.
[1] With help from the Good ISIS Team. [2] David Albright with Sarah Burkhard and the Good ISIS Team, Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security Press, 2021). Available at: https://www.politics-prose.com/book/9781624294006. Read the highlights here: https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/highlights-of-irans-perilous-pursuit-of-nuclear-weapons/. [3] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has been indicating that the number of sites with undeclared uranium exceeds the four named locations at the center of his reports to the Board of Governors. For example, he wrote: “[Some of the] isotopically altered particles [found at Turquz Abad] must have come from another unknown location.” See: IAEA Director General, NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2022/26, May 30, 2022, https://isis-online.org/uploads/iaea-reports/documents/gov2022-26.pdf.
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